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Abstract 
Based on her recently published book, Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of 
Religion, Elizabeth Shakman Hurd’s paper is an attempt at disaggregating the category of religion. It 
distinguishes between forms of knowledge about religion (including constructs of religious extremism 
and religious freedom) authorized by experts (expert religion); religion as construed and authorized by 
governments and courts at home and abroad (official or governed religion); and the broader fields of 
spiritual practices, beliefs, and forms of belonging on the ground (lived or everyday religion) which 
are entangled with but not reducible to expert or official religion. 
Keywords 
Expert religion, official religion, lived religion, religious freedom, US foreign policy. 
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Introduction 
In the fall of 2015 I received an email from a program officer in the State Department’s U.S. Speaker 
Program in the Bureau of International Information Programs. The U.S. Embassy Niamey, in Niger, 
was planning a virtual program on Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) and the officer was looking 
for “a French speaking countering-violent extremism and/or religious freedom expert (who) would 
address a closed audience for 15-30 minutes, followed by extended question and answer session with 
the closed audience.”1 The expert would address the audience at the Embassy in an opening event in 
support of an upcoming “TechCamp” in January 2016. The IIP Virtual Speaker Request Form, 
attached to the email, described TechCamp as follows: “The goal of this program, and the event itself, 
is to start a dialogue about CVE [Countering Violent Extremism] issues in the Sahel region. Having 
direct knowledge of CVE and technology situations from TechCamp participants will help us better 
match subject matter experts and technologists to the needs of our participants, enabling us to host a 
far more impactful TechCamp event in January 2016. The main viewing group will be gathered at the 
American Center in Niamey, Niger. The MSRP themes are empowering civil-society groups, religious 
freedom and countering violent extremism.”2 The call for experts then described the audience for the 
event. “The audience of the main viewing session will be 20-30 religious leaders and young civil 
society leaders selected by Post and our TechCamp implementing partner, the National Youth Council 
of Niger. Audience members will be francophone Africans. Audience members will all come from 
demographics targeted by recruiters from extremist organizations. They will be from Niamey and the 
surrounding area, and will mostly be future participants in the January TechCamp. Feedback from the 
audience of this program will go directly to shaping the theme, wider audience, training topics, trainers 
and tech tools that will be presented at the January TechCamp.” The attachment said the expert also 
might be invited to travel to Niamey as a trainer for TechCamp in early 2016. 
What exactly is a “countering-violent extremism and/or religious freedom expert?” What are the 
qualifications to be or to become such an expert? What could the and/or in that sentence possibly 
signify? Are most experts in violent extremism also experts in religious freedom, and vice versa? And 
what exactly is an extremist organization? Is it any organization that opposes U.S. policy in the Sahel 
region? Or is it limited to those who support the use of violence as a means of expressing opposition? 
What if the U.S. government is using violence against them? More to the point, what forms of expert 
knowledge about religion, freedom, and extremism are being mobilized here, by whom, and to what 
ends? And what, if anything, does any of this have to do with religion? 
The American foreign policy establishment has a long and history of collaboration with scholars 
and experts across disciplines.
3
 This isn’t new. In the context of the war on extremism, these 
partnerships are taking new forms. As suggested by the call for CVE/religious freedom experts, there 
is a special emphasis on expertise on religion and religious freedom. This essay examines the 
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intersection between religion and global governance in an age of freedom and terror. How should we 
think about religion and politics in the context of the flourishing state-sponsored international 
CVE/religious freedom agenda?  
My book, Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion, addresses this question 
by disaggregating the category of religion.
4
 It distinguishes between forms of knowledge about 
religion (including constructs of religious extremism and religious freedom) authorized by experts 
(what I call expert religion); religion as construed and authorized by governments and courts at home 
and abroad (what I call official or governed religion); and the broader fields of spiritual practices, 
beliefs, and forms of belonging on the ground (which I call lived or everyday religion) which are 
entangled with but not reducible to expert or official religion. Disaggregating and de-essentializing 
religion allows for a rather different reading of the CVE/religious freedom agenda as a form of 
extraterritorial establishment. This programming enables the political and religious empowerment of 
U.S.-friendly “religions” and their representatives and spokespersons. Particular leaders are authorized 
to speak on behalf of the American-sanctioned religious constituencies and citizenries that populate an 
emerging faith-based global landscape. Through these efforts, the U.S. government empowers these 
authorized religions and religious leaders while marginalizing others, both politically and religiously. 
Expert religion, lived religion, official religion 
To see these dynamics requires disaggregating the category of religion and moving beyond narratives 
of secularism as separation. Beyond Religious Freedom disaggregates religion into three categories: 
expert religion, governed religion, and lived religion. How do these heuristics help us understand the 
politics of the CVE/religious freedom agenda? How can we as scholars and analysts describe the 
broader context that makes possible an email from State seeking a CVE/religious freedom expert? 
The concept of expert religion is helpful. Expert religion is religion as construed by those who 
generate policy-relevant knowledge about religion, including scholars, policy experts, and government 
officials. Today in Europe and North America a particular framework dominates expert religious 
discourse: the “two faces of faith.” The two faces is shorthand for a pair of complementary 
assumptions that structure most public policy and many scholarly discussions on the subject of 
contemporary religion and public international life. The first face is the agenda of reassurance, a naïve 
celebration of religion as the source of morality, community, and freedom. The second face is the 
agenda of surveillance, which positions religion as a danger to be reformed and policed, denigrates it 
as the root of global instability and insecurity. These constructions of religion/politics generate real 
world sequelae: in the first instance, governmental support for religious “authorities,” self-identified 
and/or created by religious experts; in the second, the politics of national and global religious 
surveillance, discipline, and reform. This powerful discourse structures the contemporary global 
governance of religious diversity and drives the CVE/religious freedom agenda. Religion appears 
simultaneously as an aspect of social difference that is a potential problem—a cause of violence and 
discord—and its own solution insofar as interfaith cooperation can be institutionalized, extremists 
marginalized, and religion’s benevolent tendencies harnessed by the authorities for the public good. If 
governments and other stakeholders study and shape religion effectively, if they properly engage 
religious actors to cultivate toleration and curb extremism, then religion will contribute to international 
peace and security, economic growth, and human flourishing, and its violent potential will diminish. 
This expert consensus is the background condition for the email invitation from State and the broader 
context that generated it. 
The concept of governed or official religion is also helpful. This is religion as construed for the 
purposes of law and governance by those in positions of political and religious authority, such as the 
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US government. This includes not only states, often through the law, foreign policy, and public 
administration, but also other authorities such as supranational courts, governing entities such as the 
European Union, and international and nongovernmental organizations. It also includes churches and 
other religious organizations and hierarchies at all levels. Governed religion is informed by and deeply 
entangled with expert religion. Today in the international field, governed religion is strongly 
influenced by the two faces framework, in which religion is construed as both a governance problem 
and as its own solution. To generate particular forms of governed religion that conform to U.S. 
interests in the Sahel is the immediate objective of US Embassy Niamey’s CVE/religious freedom 
programming.  
Governed and expert religions do not, however, exhaust the religious field. This is important, and it 
is where lived or everyday religion enters the picture. This is religion as practiced by ordinary 
individuals and groups as they interact with a variety of religious authorities, rituals, texts, and 
institutions and seek to navigate and make sense of their lives, connections with others, and place in 
the world. It is a diverse field of activity, relations, investments, belief, and practices that may or may 
not be captured in the set of human goings-on that are identified as religion for the purposes of 
generating expert knowledge or meeting the aims and objective of governance. Everyday or lived 
religion may be indifferent, opposed, supportive or inassimilable to the terms of both official and 
expert religion. 
In his recent book Two Cheers for Anarchism, James Scott disaggregates modern politics in ways 
that parallel my attempt to destabilize the modern category of religion. Paralleling the distinction 
between expert/official and lived religion, Scott describes the past three centuries of the rise of the 
modern state as the triumph of “standardized, official landscapes of control and appropriation” over 
“vernacular order.” 5 Like Scott’s official and vernacular politics, expert, official, and lived religion are 
all mixed up with each other, and also with institutional religion. They cannot be disentangled. The 
distinctions between these categories are always, to an extent, arbitrary and porous, themselves the 
product of law and governance. My intention, then, is neither to romanticize lived religion as prior to 
structures and relations of power nor to identify “authentic” forms of it. There is no pure religion that 
stands independent of elite, orthodox, or legal religion. These heuristics are useful not because they 
have sharp boundaries but because they allow us to understand more fully the intertwined religious 
and political dynamics that shape the worlds we inhabit. They help us see a bigger picture by drawing 
attention to forms of sociality and religiosity that might otherwise escape our field of vision. It allows 
us to see ways of being and belonging—what we might call small “r” religion—that exist partially 
outside and, at times, in tension with big “R” Religion—the Religion protected in constitutions, by 
governments, and in international legal instruments.
6
 The former tends to fall beyond the peripheral 
vision of scholars of international law and politics who, when they look for religion, more often then 
not look for religious leaders and institutions, recognizable texts and orthodoxies, and authorities with 
long robes and ornate headgear. These authorities matter, but they do not exhaust the field.  
Opening the study of religion and global politics to this broader field generates new questions 
about religion and governance. It invites scholars and others to explore the gaps between specific 
constructs of religion, religious freedom or violent extremism as construed by the State Department, 
the Department of Defense, governing bodies of the EU or various other institutions, and a series of 
broader fields of ordinary practice, belonging and belief. The latter is often made up of multiple, 
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6
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dissenting, politically disfavored, unorthodox or minor traditions. There is a disjuncture between 
powerful constructs of religious governance—such as religious freedom and anti-extremism—defined 
by experts and enforced by states and other international authorities, and the variable and messy 
spiritual worlds of the individuals and communities they aspire to govern, reform, or redeem. And yet, 
in virtually all circumstances government advocacy for “religious freedom” and the political and 
religious empowerment of moderate religious leaders are understood as attempts to protect and engage 
pre-existing “religious” individuals and communities. But there are no such “religions” that exist 
ontologically prior to these processes of political and legal recognition. The religion that is protected 
in such efforts is the religion favored by those in positions of power. Sympathetic religions and 
religious leaders are empowered both politically and religiously through these processes. It is in this 
sense that we might speak of a form of establishment. 
The notion of secularism as separation falls apart in this context. As Matthew Scherer shows in his 
book, Beyond Church and State: Democracy, Secularism, and Conversion, the transformative 
processes that produced the notion of secularism as separation did not in fact separate religion and 
politics along a clear line of distinction, but rather re-determined the nature of both politics and 
religion simultaneously.
7
 Modern secularism, therefore, must be seen “not simply to have emerged 
from a religious past with which it has broken but instead as both divided from a religious past and yet 
also locked in continuous and shifting patterns of interrelation with religion in the present.”8 And yet 
despite the evident complexities of these interrelations, and the repeated destabilization of stable and 
ahistorical notions of religious and secular across the disciplines in recent years,
9
 so many 
contemporary governmental efforts naïvely rely on a stable rendering of the secular-religious binary to 
“solve” policy challenges—both those associated with so-called religious sources of violence, and 
those that require the alleged irenic qualities of religion as a source of morality and freedom. This is 
the preeminent narrative guiding scholars and practitioners faced with questions at the intersection of 
contemporary religion and global affairs, including those who understand themselves to be working on 
CVE/religious freedom. 
The policy prescription that emerges from this expert consensus is that “good” religion should be 
restored to international relations, while “bad” religion should be reformed or eradicated through a 
series of public-private partnerships. This narrative has largely displaced the secularization thesis, to 
the extent that the latter is understood as referring to the privatization, marginalization, or 
disappearance of religion in modernity. Both tendencies however could be described as secularist, in 
that both are deeply concerned with religion as an object of politics.
10
 As Scherer put it in a recent 
discussion of the politics of religious freedom in the Hosanna-Tabor and Hobby Lobby US Supreme 
Court decisions, “it is a distinctly secular fiction that here authorizes the autonomy of religion.”11 The 
way we talk about religion and global politics today—what I call in the book the new global politics of 
religion—is the result of a shift in the center of gravity of public and academic discourse away from an 
understanding of religion as private, internal and largely irrelevant to global governance, and toward a 
new frame, and new forms of politics, in which religion is seen as a public good, agent of 
transformation, and source of both freedom and violence.  
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How the CVE/religious freedom agenda shapes both religion and politics  
Over the past several decades, the U.S. government, its allies, and their proxies have rallied around the 
notion that legal guarantees to ensure the flourishing of free religion/countering violent extremism are 
required to emancipate societies from inter-communal strife, economic deprivation, terrorism, gender 
inequality and other social ills. It is widely believed that moderate religion, governed correctly, will 
push back and triumph over its archaic and extremist rivals. The right kind of religion, recognized and 
engaged by states and other public authorities, has emancipatory potential. It catalyzes 
democratization and takes the wind out of the sails of extremist movements. Leaders describe the 
cultivation of tolerant religion as a key ingredient in addressing the ills that plague global collective 
life.
12
 Individuals and communities are understood as in need of varying degrees of socio-religious 
engineering. Reformers are sent out to cultivate the conditions in which secular states and their 
religious subjects become tolerant, believing or nonbelieving consumers of free religion, and 
practitioners of faith-based solutions. States marshal resources, gather information, and train 
bureaucrats on how to achieve these objectives.  
This current wave of international religion programming is a combination of expert and official 
religion of a very particular kind which is, at least in part, a product of the “war on terror.” Recent 
years have seen the rise of an insatiable appetite for CVE/religious freedom experts. Experts have 
emerged to meet the demand. Academic journals are overrun with studies of religion. Analyses of the 
effects of religious actors and belief systems on political outcomes are ubiquitous. Professional 
associations have sections on religion and…every imaginable field of study. Foundations and think 
tanks rush to meet the demand for knowledge about religion in relation to every conceivable domain 
of human activity. Solutions for anxious policy makers are sought and found. The security industry, 
environmentalists, and rule of law consultants search for ways to bring religion in. In these accounts, 
religion appears as normative, singular, and prior to other affiliations and forms of sociality. There are 
things in the world called “religions” that interact with each other. Religions are unproblematic social 
facts comprised of bounded entities and faith communities to be studied, engaged, and reformed.  
In practice, this narrative shapes both religion and politics in at least three ways. First, when 
religion is conceived as a plausible explanation and a cause of political behavior, it sets the stage for—
and may be seen to require—political interventions shape it, to tap into its benevolent powers and 
tame its rough and subversive edges. Public interventions to shape religion in particular ways are 
normalized. Hence the CVE/religious freedom agenda.  
Second, to declare or presume religion as the cause of conflict, as is implied in the CVE/religious 
freedom agenda, distorts complex questions of causation and obscures the broader historical and 
political contexts in which discrimination and violence arise. An example is the discussion 
surrounding the rise of the Islamic state (ISIL), in which Islam is often named as the cause of the 
violence. As Anver Emon explains, however, the moral panic surrounding ISIS is arising out of a 
context in which the “Islamic” is being rendered as an ideology to respond to a broad history of 
political, economic, and social frustration and dispossession: “ISIS is as much Islamic as it is a product 
of broken promises at the end of the British and French mandates; ISIS is as much Islamic as it is a 
product of the American interventions in Iraq; ISIS’s brutality is as Islamic as the Ku Klux Klan’s 
lynching of Black Americans was Christian, both Islam and Christianity having been used to justify 
violent brutality. To baldly pose these claims is to reveal the parochialisms that frame debates on 
Islam and Muslims, that inform certain politics of belonging and difference (read, Fox News), and that 
bolster the state policies that flow therefrom (e.g. Shari’a legislative bans).”13 The moral panic over 
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Islam occludes a more diverse series of contributing factors that have led us to this place, artificially 
turning into a zero-sum game whether Islam is or is not tolerant, or does or does not condone violence. 
Violence and social tensions with multiple contributing factors—in the Middle East and beyond—are 
thereby depoliticized, their causes distorted or explained away through reference to intractable 
religious difference.  
Third, expert and official religion actively shape lived religion. When the authorities approach 
world religions as entities with agency subject to various forms of public oversight and governance, 
these entities begin to conform to those presumptions. There is a backflow effect of construing religion 
as a stable object of law and governance, as particular forms of religious community and agency are 
realized and strengthened. Protecting individuals, communities and traditions as religions reshapes 
both religious and political fields in very specific ways.
14
 In the current global political and religious 
climate, individuals and groups are being compelled to represent themselves and their practices as 
recognizably “religious” in order to gain access to aid, asylum, legal protection, and other social 
goods. Those who cannot or choose not to represent themselves in this way are rendered illegible or 
unintelligible under such a regime. Given legal incentives to identify oneself, and others, in a 
recognizably religious register, faith communities begin to take shape as corporate bodies on the 
international public stage, able to reap the social and material benefits of being classified by states and 
international legal authorities as religions, faith communities, or (persecuted) religionists. We see 
these dynamics today in claims for asylum in Germany in the context of the refugee crisis. Because 
asylum claims from Pakistani Christians carry more weight legally and politically in Germany, there 
has been a rise in conversions to Christianity among asylum-seekers.
15
 Both political and religious 
fields are reshaped and transformed in the process. The CVE/religious freedom agenda is a driver of 
these transformations. 
International theorists need to understand the effects on both religion and politics of expert and 
official attempts to single out religion as a stable foundation from which to formulate foreign policy, 
write constitutions, make asylum decisions, and conduct rights advocacy. Narratives taking “religion” 
as an object of intervention and platform for policy implementation should be met with skepticism. 
Government-sponsored CVE/religious freedom efforts always single out specific forms of religion, 
specific religious leaders, and particular religious traditions from a more expansive field, whether for 
engagement, reform or eradication. Moreover, the religion that is privileged, treated, or condemned 
through these efforts does not necessarily align with the disparate, improvised and syncretic forms of 
ordinary religious belonging and practice that characterize many modern lives.  
One might ask, so what does that “lived” religious field look like? Take the example of Afro-
Brazilian practices. As Dom Phillips reports in The Washington Post, aspects of both Candomblé and 
Umbanda have long been part of Brazilian culture —millions of Brazilians offer flowers to the sea 
goddess Yemanjá, who is associated with the Virgin Mary, on New Year’s Eve and on February 2. 
Candomblé’s sister religion, Umbanda, combines Candomblé with Catholic traditions and saints. As 
Phillips wrote, “on a recent Sunday in São Gonçalo, a poor suburb near Rio, an Umbanda ceremony 
featured the drumming and incorporations seen in Candomblé, but worshipers also said Catholic 
prayers.”16 Writing in Boston Review, Laura Premack describes this combination as “spiritual 
bricolage.” As she explains, “it is entirely unsurprising to meet a Brazilian who calls herself Catholic, 
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belonged to an evangelical youth group as a teenager, was married by a priest, attends a local 
Methodist church, reads Spiritist books, draws mandalas to relax, and consults an Umbanda priest for 
advice.”17  
This is the religion of much of the world. Whether in Brazil, the United States, Japan, or Albania, it 
is often difficult to classify individuals as believers or nonbelievers in a single and stable religious 
tradition. Dissidents, doubters, those who practice multiple traditions, nonorthodox versions of 
protected traditions, or no (recognizable) tradition at all, struggle for representation on a faith-based 
global landscape that privileges strongly “formatted” U.S. and European-friendly religions and their 
appointed representatives.  
Conclusion 
Contemporary CVE/religious freedom programs are modern political and legal strategies for 
controlling the political and religious lives of foreign subjects. These initiatives shape and tailor both 
individual and collective lives. Professional transnational religion experts and governors are hard at 
work to meet the global demand for tolerant religious subjects who enjoy “freedom” under law and 
shun whatever the authorities define as political/religious extremism. This explains why CVE/religious 
freedom can be represented as a single field of expertise: by definition, shunning whatever the 
authorities define as “extremism” is understood as a means of achieving “religious freedom.” 
Disaggregating religion tells a different story. In privileging whatever and whomever the 
authorities define as moderate religion and tolerant religious leaders, such programs require these 
authorities to determine what counts as religion and to distinguish between moderate and immoderate, 
legal and illegal, and tolerable and intolerable forms of it. Not only does this exclude “non-religious,” 
dissenting and unorthodox traditions, it also risks exacerbating the tensions these projects are designed 
to mitigate by hardening more fluid lines of difference between groups, fomenting intra-communal 
conflict, and inserting an international dimension into what were once local matters. My colleagues in 
the Politics of Religious project have documented these dynamics in contexts around the world, 
including post-Soviet Central Asia, India, Malaysia, South Sudan and Egypt.
18
 
Government-sponsored CVE/religious freedom programs construe and create “religious” groups as 
both political actors and faith communities. Religious engagement officers in Brussels or Washington 
breathe a sigh of relief: “finally, here are the partners we’ve been waiting for.” But there is no single 
“religion” or set of religions waiting offstage in the margins of “secular” public life to be engaged or 
reformed. That is a myth. That which falls under the heading of religion is a contested and evolving 
mash-up of shifting and diverse families of beliefs, institutional forms, and fields of practice and 
experience. State-sponsored religious outreach forcibly distills this complex field into something 
governable. It squeezes a diverse set of human goings-on into the mold of whatever the authorities 
define as tolerant religions that merit political engagement. That religion is given a seat at the table, 
and others are not. This creates a divide between officially favored religion and the rest of world’s 
religion—including practices that many would consider sacred but that don’t qualify as a religion, and 
those associated with political and/or religious opponents or dissidents. Unofficial, unsanctioned, 
unorthodox practices, traditions, encounters with the gods are crowded out. All religions may be equal, 
but some are always more equal than others.  
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Seen this way, the assumption that the top-down legalization of freedom of religion and state-
sponsored engagement with faith communities through CVE and related programming will 
emancipate society from persecution and discrimination appears to be deeply flawed. The opposite 
may be the case. Such efforts serve to exacerbate social tensions by making religious difference a 
matter of law and public policy, exaggerating the divide between the religion of those in power and 
those without it. And yet today claims for justice articulated in the languages of religious freedom and 
religious moderation resonate loudly in the corridors of power. The new global politics of religion 
rewards those who speak this language. It compels individuals and groups with multiple and 
intersecting identities and histories to register and constitute themselves publically and politically as 
religious, tolerant, freedom loving faith communities. In this setting, these individuals and groups have 
every incentive to demand religious rights and freedoms. And they do. When states and other 
authorities posit discrete religious identities and communities as defining features on the global 
political landscape, it lends authority and authenticity to groups designated as religions. Agency and 
community are assumed to conform with, and are conferred on, these entities. Boundaries between 
religions, and between religion and non-religion, are naturalized and normalized.
19
 New corporate 
forms of religious agency and authority take shape, and defend their ground. Old hierarchies are 
reasserted and re-figured. At the same time, those who cannot or choose not to speak in a recognizably 
religious register go unheard. This includes claimants for justice, equality and dignity that cannot or 
choose not to speak as religionists. It also includes scholars and analysts who prefer to steer clear of 
the CVE/religious freedom industry and its unceasing demand for experts.  
It is not difficult to picture “TechCamp” at US Embassy Niamey, with a francophone American 
expert on religious freedom/countering violent extremism counseling local citizens from 
“demographics targeted by recruiters from extremist organizations” on how to be tolerant, free, and 
pro-American. At best, such programming is a distraction from serious efforts to address the complex 
and deeply intersected causes of violence and discrimination through local initiatives that support 
education, economic opportunity, and just governance. At worst, it risks politicizing religious 
difference and fomenting the very radicalization it is intended to prevent. I deleted the email from 
State. 
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